Having risen year on year between 2021 and 2023, irregular migration to Europe appeared to dip in 2024 and continued to fall in the first seven months of 2025. EU officials have attributed this downward trend to the successful implementation of various deterrence-based policies, including the expansion of Europe’s partnership agreements with governments in North Africa, West Africa and the Middle East. However, even as some routes have seen less movement, others have experienced a resurgence – including, notably, the increasing prominence of previously marginal migration routes connecting Algeria with the Balearics and Libya with Crete. Given the historic fluctuations in arrivals, the adaptability of smuggling networks and the continued demand to migrate – particularly, in conflict-affected countries, such as Mali – it may be premature to conclude that irregular migration into Europe is in retreat.
Graphic 1. Irregular arrivals to Europe 2018 – 2025*
*The 2025 estimates are calculated using the published January-to-August 2025 figures and the average share of yearly arrivals occurring in the same period during 2018 to 2024, with an additional adjustment to reflect most recent trends using % change from 2024 and 2025 January-to-August figures applied to the September-to-December 2025 estimates.
In the meantime, the mood across the continent has become markedly more hostile towards migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, which is reflected in recent deportation drives, increasing establishment of intra-EU border controls within the Schengen-zone and the rollback of refugee resettlement programmes, migrant welfare provisions and family reunification. This apparent shift is vividly illustrated by Germany’s vocal calls for tougher migration and asylum policies. While previously a leading advocate within the EU for fair and inclusive asylum processes, the German government is now implementing a series of harsh provisions that signal a very different approach to migration and asylum moving forward.
Eastern Mediterranean route to Greece
After a significant increase in movement during 2024, with the annual total rising more than 27 percent to 62,119, the number arriving in Greece in the first seven months of 2025 (25,870) was almost identical to the total in the same period in 2024 (25,887). Between January and June 2025, the most represented groups among arrivals were from Afghanistan (29.9%), Egypt (23.4%), Sudan (14.4%) and Eritrea (4.4%). Syrians, having been the most represented nationality in 2024 at more than a third (35%) of all arrivals, accounted for just 2.9 percent – a decline largely attributed to the fall of the Assad regime on December 2024.
Graphic 2. Eastern Mediterranean route 2025: three-year comparative data of arrivals
However, while overall movement along the Eastern Mediterranean route remained much the same, a noticeable uptick was evident in the number of migrants entering Greece through Crete and the neighbouring island of Gavdos, with 9,753 arrivals as of 13 July. Much of this uptick in movement comprises Egyptians, Sudanese and Bangladeshis embarking from Libya, in contrast to the predominance of Syrians and Afghans evident among those journeying from Türkiye. While the situation has generated considerably more media coverage in recent months, the increase in popularity was already evident in 2024, when the total number of migrants travelling along this route rose by around six times compared to the year before.
Migration to Cyprus, having already decreased by more than 44 percent in 2024 to an annual total of 6,097, continued to fall in the first seven months of 2025 to 1,414 – less than a third (30%) of the total in the same period the previous year (4,645). This reduction has been driven by a range of restrictive measures by Cypriot authorities to curb arrivals, beginning with the suspension of Syrian asylum applications in May 2024. In May 2025, Cyprus and Syria signed an agreement to enable the return of Syrians apprehended at sea, with authorities also announcing, the same month, a planned cash assistance programme to promote returns to Syria, with one family member permitted to stay on the island to work for a period of three years. Nevertheless, Syrians still made up the largest group among arrivals (36.7%) in the first six months of 2025, followed by nationals from Sudan (12.1%), Afghanistan (11.6%), Somalia (8.8%) and Iran (7.7%).
According to IOM’s Missing Migrants data portal, a total of 132 people died or disappeared in the first half of 2025 along the Eastern Mediterranean route, compared to during the same period of 2024. Among the most deadly incidents was the sinking of a boat off the coast of Cyprus on 17 March 2025, with seven dead and 14 missing following the incident.
Uptick in migration from Libya to Crete
In recent months, the emergence of the Libya-Crete route as a major entry point to Greece has led to an increasingly fraught relationship between the EU and authorities in Libya. While the EU has called on Libya to do more to prevent these crossings, in line with its long-standing arrangement around migration management, thousands have continued to arrive on the island. This latest impasse highlights the fragility of the various ‘partnerships’ underpinning the EU’s externalisation strategy, particularly against a backdrop of growing geopolitical uncertainty. In this instance, a major source of contention is the controversial 2019 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Libya and Türkiye around maritime oil and gas exploration, brokered without any recognition of Greek and Cypriot claims over some of the areas covered in the agreement.
In light of these tensions, some analysts have even privately suggested that Libya may be exploiting irregular migration to put pressure on Greece and the EU – though it should also be noted that the internationally recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli has, in fact, controlled only a portion of the country. Much of Libya, including the eastern areas from where most Crete-bound boats are departing, is under the aegis of the rival, Russia-backed Government of National Stability (GNS). The GNS’s importance for Moscow has only intensified since the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024 and the loss of its naval base in Tartus. Other analysts fear that, with Russian backing, General Khalifa Haftar, the warlord and de facto ruler of eastern Libya, is attempting to weaponise migration against the EU.
The complications of having two competing authorities in place have further hampered efforts to reach a diplomatic agreement, as highlighted in early July, when several senior EU officials were deported from eastern Libya by the de facto authorities there. The delegation, who had arrived to discuss irregular migration, were apparently denied entry because they had first visited the internationally recognised rival government in Tripoli. However, some reports suggested that their refusal to be photographed alongside GNS ministers on arrival may have provoked their expulsion. Since then, however, the EU migration commissioner has called for renewed negotiations with Haftar to reach an agreement. (See also Keeping Track in Africa)
Greece imposes more restrictions against migrants
In early July, in response to the uptick in movement from Libya, the Greek government – having threatened to send warships to intercept migrant vessels – announced a three-month suspension of asylum applications from those who had embarked from North Africa. Under the proposal, anyone arriving in Greece would be automatically sent back to their country of origin without registration.
This controversial move (echoing a 2020 move to suspend asylum, that was widely criticised at the time) appears to not even include exceptions for vulnerable groups, such as unaccompanied minors and pregnant women, and overlooks the fact that some of those attempting the journey (including displaced Sudanese) would typically be recognised as refugees. Ultimately, the worst affected by these provisions – which have been condemned by human rights groups as a violation of international law – are people seeking protection.
The asylum suspension is only one of a number of measures during the year that threaten to erode migrant and refugee protections, including the announcement in May of an eviction order for refugees and asylum seekers in camps across the country, prompting criticism from human rights organisations. The government is also reportedly mulling the implementation of a “disincentive-based policy” to deter arrivals by reducing benefits for asylum seekers, and is developing legislation that could see rejected asylum seekers jailed for up to five years if they do not leave the country “voluntarily”.
Western Balkans
The Western Balkans has seen one of the most precipitous drops in irregular migration of any route, falling from a peak of 145,600 in 2022 to just over 21,500 in 2024. This trend appears to have continued in 2025, with just over 6,540 detected crossings in the first seven months – a fall of 47 percent compared to the same period the previous year. The most represented countries of origin were Türkiye, Afghanistan and Syria. However, concerns have been raised about the quality of data collection in the region and the potential incentives for governments to report low arrivals figures as proof of the effectiveness of migration restrictions. The Italian Consortium of Solidarity has also argued that some of the apparent reduction in movement along the route may be due to the growing frequency of illegal pushbacks and the invisibility of smuggling operations there.
Increasing border security in Bosnia leaves migrants exposed
In recent years, the EU has invested significant efforts in bolstering security not only at the borders of member states such as Croatia, but also in neighbouring countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina to stem irregular migration there. In June, an agreement was signed allowing Frontex personnel to operate alongside Bosnian security officials and deploy its personnel along the country’s borders, including those with other non-EU states. Recent investigations have highlighted the deleterious living conditions, protracted processing times and lack of access to essential services that migrants face in the country’s detention facilities. Reports have also emerged of how, in response to more restrictive border policies, smuggling groups have adapted their tactics to focus on kidnapping and abusing migrants for ransom, with victims of pushbacks particularly targeted.
Europe tightens restrictions on migration – with Germany leading the way
2025 saw a further rightward shift in Europe’s attitude to irregular migration. This was epitomised by Germany’s apparent volte face, following the election of Friedrich Merz as chancellor, from the EU’s lead progressive voice on the issue to a vocal advocate of tougher policies, tighter border control and increased deportations. Besides calling for stricter measures to curb irregular migration, including the resumption of deportations to Afghanistan and Syria. Germany has also rolled back various rights and protections for recognised refugees, freezing the country’s refugee admissions programme and announcing a two-year suspension of family reunification for refugees already in the country.
Other countries have passed similar measures, often either ahead of or in the wake of national elections, but the dramatic repositioning of Germany around migration and asylum is especially striking. In the words of the German minister of the interior, Germany is “no longer sitting in the brakeman’s cab on migration issues in Europe, but is in the locomotive.” This attitude is increasingly in evidence across Europe. The mood among many European governments was illustrated in May 2025, when Denmark, Italy and seven other countries (Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the Czech Republic) issued a joint statement calling for a “new and open-minded conversation about the interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights”, with particular reference to its interpretation in migration-related cases.
At the EU level, a major milestone was the proposal, in March, of the Common European System for Returns, a new framework designed to clarify and accelerate return procedures across all member states. A central rationale of the legislation, if it is approved, is to expedite (including through the use of forced returns, if necessary) the speedy repatriation of migrants who are not authorised to remain in the EU. This is, in part, a response to the very low return rates evident across the EU, estimated at around 20 percent. Germany, building on an uptick in deportations in recent years, deported around 11,800 people in the first half of 2025 – a significant rise from the 9,500 deported in the first half of 2024. Other countries, such as Portugal, have also launched deportation drives to remove undocumented migrants from their territories.
One of the instruments highlighted in the proposed system is the use of so-called return hubs to facilitate returns by sending unauthorised migrants scheduled for return to a designated third country while their repatriation to their country of origin is arranged. Though stopping short of establishing a shared EU-wide system – previously mentioned as a possibility under consideration in the draft legislation – it nevertheless paves the way for more countries to outsource detention in this way. While Italy has recently reconfigured its external asylum processing facilities in Albania for this purpose, it seems likely that other EU countries might follow suit. The UK, meanwhile, has already announced that it is considering a number of countries including Kosovo, Serbia, North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as potential locations for a return hub system of its own
Among the most significant stumbling blocks to the implementation of more restrictive migration policies is the contested notion of ‘safe countries’ – a concept that was showcased in the Pact on Asylum and Migration, passed in 2024. This designation for countries deemed safe for unauthorised migrants to be returned to has been repeatedly challenged in different contexts in both domestic and European courts. Italy’s original proposal to detain intercepted migrants from a selection of designated ‘safe’ countries in facilities in Albania was rejected by the Italian courts precisely because, while generally safe, the countries in question were not safe for all regions and minorities – the benchmark stipulated in EU law. However, in April, the EU published a list of safe countries that included, in addition to EU candidate countries such as Albania and Türkiye, seven other countries: Kosovo, Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, India, Morocco and Tunisia. It is hoped that the list will provide a common frame of reference for different EU member states, many of whom have separate lists: Germany, for instance, currently lists 10 non-EU countries and is looking to expand these to include four more, despite vocal criticism from activists and opposition MPs. Nevertheless, a ruling by the European Court of Justice at the beginning of August in relation to Italy’s proposed facilities in Albania may complicate these plans. While allowing for countries to develop safe country lists for fast-tracked asylum procedures, it also stipulates that the sources for these assessments should be disclosed and the classification subject to legal scrutiny. It also reiterated that, to be included, countries should be safe for their entire populations, minorities included.
The issue of ‘secondary migration’ – the movement of irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers between different countries within the Schengen zone – has been in the spotlight as a result of Germany’s pushback of migrants to Poland and Lithuania. While this phenomenon is not new, as Germany has sent back migrants in previous years under the EU’s Dublin Agreement or bilateral readmission procedures, what distinguishes these pushbacks is that the majority have been facilitated by Germany imposing border controls with its neighbours, within the free-movement Schengen area. Though Germany’s implementation of border controls extends back to 2023, the Merz government has taken this further by announcing, in May, a new policy of turning back asylum seekers at the border without assessing their claims. While the move has been challenged by a Berlin court, Poland – contending with far-right protests on this issue – has itself imposed similar controls on its borders with Germany and Lithuania. The standoff speaks to the profound impact that irregular migration has had within the EU, in particular around the fundamental principle of passport-free movement within the Schengen zone. (For more details see Thematic snapshot Migration policy in a rightward-shifting political landscape: the case of Germany).
Central Mediterranean route to Italy
According to UNHCR, in the first seven months of 2025 there were 36,406 registered sea arrivals in Italy, up almost 9 percent compared to the same period in 2024. In the first half of the year, the most represented countries of origin among sea arrivals in Italy were Bangladesh (32.4%), Eritrea (14.5%), Egypt (11.8%), Pakistan (8.7%) and Ethiopia (4.8%) (see also Keeping Track in Africa).
According to data from IOM’s Missing Persons Project, at least 666 people died or disappeared along the Central Mediterranean route in the first seven months of 2025, compared to 1,032 during the same period in 2024. Even with the apparent reduction in the fatalities, this means that more than three people on average are dying or disappearing every day along the route. The increasing restrictions on search and rescue operations are one factor in the high mortality rates, as evidenced in a June 2025 report by MSF. Following the implementation of legislation at the beginning of 2023 that severely constrains the ability of NGOs to undertake humanitarian rescue, the number of migrants rescued by MSF’s boat Geobarents reportedly halved from 4,646 in 2023 to 2,278 in 2024. On August 2025, the Libyan coastguard (using an EU-funded vessel) shot directly at the humanitarian boat Ocean Viking, inflicting serious damage. Though the action generated significant criticism in Italy from opposition parties and was described by Frontex as “deeply concerning” commentators have argued that it was a predictable outcome after “years of impunity” and “EU-funded aggression”.
Italy’s failed Albania migrant facilities repurposed as return hubs
Italy’s controversial migration facilities in Albania, originally built with the aim of holding asylum seekers while their claims were processed, were suspended shortly after opening in October 2024, following repeated legal rulings against their continued operations. While the two centres were designed to hold up to 3,000 migrants intercepted at sea every month, the government was forced to transfer the first group of asylum seekers sent to the facilities back to Italy almost immediately following a court ruling on October that their countries of origin (in this case, Bangladesh and Egypt) could not be considered safe to return to, in line with the EU’s categorisation at the time. Despite widespread condemnation by human rights groups, the European Commission has been broadly supportive of Italy’s proposal. However, further court rulings, in November 2024 and January 2025, against the detention of migrants at the facilities appeared to stymie their use indefinitely, pending a ruling by the European Court of Justice as to its legality under EU law. In August, the European Court of Justice ruled that the Italian government’s current definition of what constitutes a ‘safe country’ (a central component of its offshore processing model) was in violation of EU law, further undermining the basis for the original proposal.
However, at the end of March, in response to these legal roadblocks and in anticipation of the August ruling, the Italian government passed a decree to enable these centres to be used as holding facilities for rejected asylum seekers prior to their deportation In April, 41 rejected asylum seekers were sent to the facilities, though were subsequently sent back to Italy. An opposition MP who visited the facilities towards the end of the month described conditions as “a hell compared to Italian detention centres” and highlighted the numerous incidents, including self-harm and suicide attempts, that had reportedly occurred since their reopening. Nevertheless, the use of the facilities for repatriation was subsequently approved in the courts, before being passed in the Lower House and then the Senate in May
Though the first deportation – of a Bangladeshi national – related to the Albania facility occurred in late April, the deportation ultimately took place from Italy rather than Albania. The first deportations direct from the facilities in Albania took place in early May. The detention facilities have been widely criticised with calls from NGOs for the agreement with Albania to be suspended. Despite these controversies, the Italian repatriation centres follow a similar model to the ‘return hubs’ now being proposed across the EU.
Western Mediterranean and Atlantic routes to Spain
According to UNHCR, the total number of arrivals in Spain in the first seven months of 2025 was 20,629, a reduction of 30 percent compared to the same period the previous year (29,790). However, when disaggregating by route, the picture was much more mixed. Movement along the Atlantic route, while still accounting for the majority of arrivals (11,614) during this period, was nevertheless down by 48 percent compared to the same period in 2024 (22,035). Along the Western Mediterranean route, on the other hand, the total (9,025) was 16 percent higher than during the same period the previous year (7,755) This is partly due to the sharp rise in migration to the Balearic islands, with 4,388 detected arrivals as of 17 August. Arrivals from Morocco into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta have also increased during 2025, with more than 2,400 as of the end of August with a marked spike from late July, when large groups of migrants tried to cross by swimming across the border
Graphic 3. Atlantic and Western Mediterranean routes – arrivals to Spain (sea and land arrivals including Canary Islands)
The most represented countries of origin among arrivals in Spain in the first five months of 2025, according to Frontex data, were Mali (37.5%), Senegal (16.8%), Algeria (12.2%), Morocco (9.2%) and Guinea (8.2%). However, there are significant differences in the composition along the different routes: while Algeria, Somalia and Morocco were the most represented countries of origin along the Western Mediterranean route, migrants travelling the Atlantic route were predominantly from Mali, Senegal and Guinea.
Until recently a relatively minor entry way to Europe, the Balearics have emerged as a more prominent route for migrants travelling from Algeria. Most depart from the central coast of Algeria towards a range of destinations within the Balearics, including Ibiza, Cabrera, Mallorca and Menorca. While the trajectory of the route was already evident in 2024, with close to 6,000 migrants arriving in the Balearics (almost six times the total in 2023) the speed and scale of the uptick during 2025 has rapidly evolved. As concerns mount over the increasing number of deaths and disappearances along the route – at least 31 bodies of potential migrants washed ashore in the first half of the year alone, including the remains of five people who had been tied at their hands and feet – there have been urgent calls to expand local search and rescue capacity.
With the exception of a minority from Morocco and sub-Saharan Africa, most migrants heading to the Balearics are Algerians themselves. The increasing popularity of the route has been driven by a number of factors, including economic and political instability within Algeria, as well as the indirect impacts of Europe’s restrictive migration policies in countries such as Morocco and Tunisia, making departures from these countries more difficult. A further issue is the limited availability of opportunities for legal migration from Algeria, with Schengen visa denial rates now among the highest of any country
Unaccompanied minors in the Canary Islands to be redistributed to other regions
Against a backdrop of worsening humanitarian conditions for migrants held on the Canary Islands, including recent reports of abuse at one of the local shelters, there has been limited progress around discussions to redistribute some of the more than 5,000 unaccompanied minors currently there. Despite a Supreme Tribunal ruling in March requiring the Spanish government to arrange the redistribution of at least 1,000 unaccompanied minors across mainland Spain within 10 days, by May – with no apparent progress in the ensuing months – the court called on the government to explain what actions it had taken to implement the order.
The proposal has been stalled by continued resistance to resettlement from some autonomous regions in Spain and rising anti-migrant sentiment. The president of the Canary Islands condemned the lack of progress, saying that “progress is only going to be made because it is ordered by the courts, not because of the political will to respect the human rights of minors, nor out of solidarity with the Canary Islands people”. The first transfer of migrant children finally began in August, with a total of 800 minors (predominantly Malians) due to be distributed across the country, though both the Conservative People’s Party and the far-right Vox continue to obstruct their resettlement.
Channel crossing from France to the UK
In 2023, while the number of migrants entering the United Kingdom (UK) irregularly from France in small boats fell from a record-breaking peak in 2022, arrivals rose again during 2024 by 25 percent to a total of 36,816. Movement along this route has continued to rise in 2025, with 25,436 arrivals between January and the end of July – an increase of 50 percent compared to the same period the previous year (16,903).
Graphic 4. Arrivals to the United Kingdom via the Channel crossing 2022 – 2025*
France and the UK reach agreement on maritime interceptions
With the number of crossings to the UK reaching unprecedented levels in the first four months of 2025, in early June the Home Office announced plans for France to intercept migrant vessels at sea for the first time. This proposal was supposedly intended to tackle a shift in smuggling tactics in the Channel, including the deployment of smuggler-operated vessels which travel along the coast picking up paying customers. Until then, French police focused on apprehending migrants on land before they embarked on the water since maritime law prohibited them from operating at sea except to undertake rescues (though, in practice, some interceptions at sea have reportedly been carried out unofficially since at least 2022). From July, a new ‘maritime doctrine’ authorises French security personnel to intercept vessels up to 300 metres from the shore. A coastguard log leaked the same month, involving an incident where a dinghy slashed in the waters by the French gendarmerie still managed to reach the UK despite being damaged, highlighted concerns about the safety and effectiveness of this approach. In the wake of a recent investigation by Lighthouse Reports on the brutal interceptions of boats by French security forces in Mayotte, including a number that have led directly to the deaths of migrants on board, there are concerns that these violent tactics could be replicated in the Channel.
The UK-France ‘one in, one out’ migration agreement
A recent agreement brokered between the United Kingdom and France in response to the continued rise in migrant Channel crossings may signal the possibilities of a different approach to irregular migration. Their ‘one in, one out’ agreement, signed in June and coming into force in August, allows the UK to immediately apprehend and return people who have entered irregularly on small boats in return for accepting an equivalent number of people in France with strong ties or family in the UK. The pilot programme will initially be capped at around 50 a week, but will likely increase over time.
While French authorities have highlighted the potential opportunities this could offer to reduce smuggling activity, the UK government has framed it as a means to “increase returns to Europe”. Nevertheless, the arrangement offers a more nuanced and pragmatic approach than previous efforts to deter irregular migration – from the failed ‘Rwanda plan’ put forward by the former Conservative government, to recent legislation by the current administration barring refugees who entered the country irregularly from ever gaining citizenship. UNHCR responded with tentative optimism to the proposal, stating that “if appropriately implemented, it could help achieve a more managed and shared approach, offering alternatives to dangerous journeys, while upholding access to asylum”.
What distinguishes it from conventional deterrence-based approaches is its recognition of the reality of irregular migration. While representing one aspect of the UK’s migration policy, which in other areas has become increasingly restrictive in recent months, the agreement has the potential to offer a more positive approach to managing irregular migration while at least offering a limited pathway to safe, regular movement. However, local charities have criticised the programme as insufficient, addressing “only a drop in the ocean” of current need, and highlighted the potential for migrants with valid protection needs to be deported to France under the scheme. In August, dozens of migrants were reportedly detained in the UK to be sent back to France as part of the new arrangement. On 18 September, the first person to be removed under the scheme (an Indian national) was removed to France, with another (an Eritrean national) transferred the following day. Returns scheduled for the week of 15 September were cancelled at the last minute for days in a row, due to various legal challenges (for example, when those scheduled for removal claimed to be victims of trafficking or torture). While the UK government denies the deal is in chaos, it is clear it is not yet working as planned, with French authorities also warning it could be abandoned if it is not functioning well.
Eastern Border
The Eastern Border, a 6,000-kilometre land border separating various EU member states from Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, has become increasingly prominent in recent years since first Belarus and then Russia were accused of “weaponising” migration against the EU. With movement having trebled in 2024, the number of detected irregular crossings in the first seven months of 2025 fell by 45 percent compared to the same period the previous year. The most common country of origin was Ukraine – a group comprised primarily of military-age men who, unlike the millions living as refugees in Europe, are prohibited by the Ukrainian government from leaving the country – followed by Somalia and Ethiopia.
Pushbacks and denial of asylum
In 2021, in response to what appeared to be a coordinated effort by President Aleksandr Lukashenko to send thousands of migrants into its territory, Poland closed its border with Belarus. As a result, thousands of migrants were left trapped in deteriorating humanitarian conditions, without access to food, shelter or medical assistance. According to IOM, at least 113 people have died in the area since 2021, including 20 between January and July 2025. While the right-wing Law and Justice party lost power in Poland in 2023, there has been little sign of improvement since the progressive, pro-EU Donald Tusk took power, with militarisation at the border increased. In March, the Polish government voted to impose a 60-day suspension of the right to asylum at the border, subsequently extended in May for another 60 days.
Polish security forces continue to violently expel migrants, often with the use of batons and tear gas, back into the so-called exclusion zone between the two countries. The growing securitisation of the border has only increased the risks for migrants who find themselves exposed to beatings and mistreatment by both Polish and Belarusian guards, locking them into a “cycle of abuse”. A monitoring report published in February 2025, documenting pushbacks across Europe, found that Poland had committed at least 13,600 incidents between January and the end of November 2024. However, while accounting for the majority of cases at the Eastern Border, Poland was by no means the only country to engage in these practices: for the whole year, 5,388 pushbacks to Belarus were reported in Latvia and 1,002 in Lithuania.
The ‘weaponisation’ of irregular migration by hostile governments has also encouraged other states to impose more restrictive border policies in response. In October 2024, the EU expressed concerns about Poland’s proposal to suspend asylum, by December of the same year, it had issued a statement authorising Poland and other countries bordering Belarus and Russia to do so temporarily, if the latter are instrumentalising irregular migration against them. Under the Crisis and Force Majeure provision introduced under the framework of the Pact on Asylum and Migration, EU member states are able to “request the authorisation to apply derogations or to benefit from solidarity measures”, including the temporary suspension of the right to seek asylum. In June, Finland’s parliament voted to extend its suspension of asylum (first introduced in July 2024) at its border with Russia until the end of 2026. In addition, in June, the Finnish government launched a pilot reception centre to promote voluntary returns shortly after completing the first section of a fence it is constructing along the border.
Ukraine
Almost four years into the conflict that began in February 2022 with Russia’s illegal invasion, Ukraine continues to be Europe’s largest displacement crisis. In addition to almost 3.8 million IDPs, dispersed across the country but particularly concentrated in the eastern oblasts of Dnipropetrovska and Kharkivska, as well as in and around the capital Kyiv, there are more than 4.1 million IDP and refugee returnees who also face a range of assistance needs. For many IDPs, their situation has been protracted, with two in three (66%) having been displaced for two years or more. For some, this prolonged state of upheaval has left them with limited access to basic services, adequate shelter and livelihood opportunities.
While their current conditions are desperate, the future for much of this displaced population remains uncertain. A survey conducted in April 2025 found that fewer than one in five (19%) of IDPs intended to return to their place of origin in the medium term, of whom the majority (68%) would only do so once the war had ended. In the longer term, around a third (34%) intended to return, with another quarter (24%) still unsure as to their plans. This points to the lasting disruption and upheaval wrought by the conflict, a legacy that will likely persist long after the fighting has ended. Given the enduring impacts that displacement will have for many civilians, particularly for women, children, persons with disabilities and marginalised communities such as Roma, development agencies have emphasised the need for an inclusive process of “human-centred recovery”.
An uncertain future for Ukraine’s refugees
In addition to the internally displaced population, there are nearly 5.7 million registered Ukrainian refugees worldwide, the majority in Europe (5.1 million), including Germany (1.23 million), Poland (1 million) and Czechia (0.37 million). Around 1.2 million others, not formally included in UNHCR’s figures, are based in Russia in a “refugee-like situation”. Thanks to the EU’s Temporary Protection Directive (TDP), agreed shortly after the Russian invasion, Ukrainians have been able to seek sanctuary across the EU – a remarkable gesture at a time when European immigration policy in general has become far more exclusionary. In June 2025, the TPD was again extended until March 2027.
While, at the time of writing, efforts at a US-brokered peace deal were ongoing, observers fear that these negotiations could lead to an inequitable ceasefire on Moscow’s terms, permanently entrenching the displacement of many Ukrainians from areas under Russia’s control in the process. There are also concerns that, once an agreement is in place, EU member states may begin to pressure displaced Ukrainians to return despite the potential dangers of renewed conflict and the widespread damage to services, housing and infrastructure there. While the Ukrainian government is already urging its refugee diaspora to come back once the fighting has ended surveys suggest that returns will be gradual rather than immediate, highlighting the need for a phased and consultative approach from host countries.
Peter Grant
Author
Peter Grant is a researcher, writer and editor specialising in migration, urban development, and climate change
